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Abstract: 
The concept of cultura universalis as found in Comenius still is a challenge for our time 





Der Begriff der cultura universalis, wie er sich bei Comenius findet, stellt eine 
Herausforderung für unsere Zeit dar, weil er uns dazu ermutigt, in kulturellen Differenzen 
Gelegenheiten zu wechselseitiger Zusammenarbeit und Ergänzung zu sehen. 
 
Keywords: 






Cultura universalis in Comenius – a Challenge for the 21st Century? 
Uwe Voigt (Augsburg) 
 
Our time faces the challenge that once more cultural differences seem to play an important role 
for our everyday life as well as for global politics.1 Part of this challenge is to understand what 
these cultures and the civilizations carrying them2 really are and how they are and should be 
related to one another. In this regard, the concept of cultura universalis in Comenius can be 
seen as a welcome corrective to some recent approaches to the phenomenon of culture.3 
 
1. The Concept of Culture: Some Philosophical Sources of Its Recent Resurgence 
Why has culture become such urgent a topic during the past decades? Apart from political 
events and social trends, this resurgence seems to have some eminent philosophical sources, 
                                                          
1 See e.g. the challenges mentioned at the beginning of Meinert Meyer’s contribution to this book. 
2 Here and subsequently I will not differentiate between ‚culture‘ and ‚civilization‘. 
3 Cf. Voigt 2011a. 
i.e. sources on a plane where a confrontation with the thought of Comenius might immediately 
make sense: In his influential work A Study of History (1934-1961), Arnold Toynbee pictures 
civilizations as entities with profound and decisive influence on history and current politics, 
entities which are developing, flourishing and declining also because of their mutual contacts 
which pose challenges to them that demand proper responses. After the demise of the City of 
God resp. Devil, the classes and the races and of similar agents, Toynbee obviously has found 
decent ‘big’ subjects of history which can be referred to without hurting what today is called 
political correctness. From the late Wittgenstein, arguments can be derived that we even must 
refer to such collective subjects,4 because understanding as a basic human activity can take 
place only in the context of a concrete given, historically grown culture: In order to understand 
anything at all, you have to understand the whole way of life wherein whatever you are trying 
to understand is embedded.5 This makes civilizations necessary and insurmountable frames of 
mutual human understanding which also are mutually opaque to one another. Therefore today 
we are very wary of the seemingly self-understood presuppositions an author – and be it 
Comenius – uses to justify his best and up to our own days attractive intentions:6 They might 
be just a heritage from a passed-away civilization remote from and no longer adaptable to our 
own. 
 
2. Recent Formations of the Concept of Culture 
Against this background, it is easy to see why the concept of culture resp. civilization figures 
so prominent in some recent publications which have had a huge impact way beyond academia: 
Francis Fukuyama Fukuyama (1992) depicts western civilization sees Western civilization with 
its technological mastering of nature and its emphasis on universal human rights as the ultimate 
and soon-to-be only form of civilization which can peacefully await the extinction of all of its 
competitors which have no choice but to resolve into it. Hence results the universality of a 
particular culture. This view, which is closely echoed by the later Richard Rorty,7 has found its 
counterpart in Samuel Huntington’s concept of the ‘clash of civilizations’ (1996) according to 
which the very dominance of Western civilization strengthens the self-awareness and triggers 
the resistance of other civilizations; together with the impending slow social and economic 
decline of the West, this is supposed to lead to a continuous dynamic competition between the 
various civilizations.8 This conception, too, endorses some kind of universality: the very 
particularity of each and every civilization is acknowledged and hypostasized into a seemingly 
general and eternal condition under which all civilizations forever have to exist as black boxes 
mutually closed against one another, in the final analysis blind self-reproducing, and in doing 
so changing, mechanisms just trying to survive and propagate themselves into the next 
generations at the costs of other civilizations. Whatever change is involved herein is not 
intentional in that sense that it aims at a purposeful improvement of the mutual relations of 
                                                          
4 Cf. Kogge 2002, Part 1. 
5  Cf. e.g. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, § 23, in: id. 1984, 250. 
6 Cf. the last section of Meinert Meyer’s contribution to this book with his reference to Rorty. Of course, Meyer 
does not draw the radical conclusion that we do no longer have any access to Comenius but shows that we cannot 
simply adopt his point of view without regarding that we always have to proceed from our own perspective. 
77 Cf. Kogge 2006, p. 333 and also the contribution of Meyer to this publication. 
8 For a discussion already in the perspective of the concept of peace in Comenius see Beck 2005, 537. 
civilizations but remains within the emerging framework of ‘mutation and selection’, laying 
bare the Darwinian foundations of this conception.9 
 
3. Cultura universalis in Comenius 
Of course we cannot find our contemporary concept of culture or civilization directly in 
Comenius – and even if we could, this would bereave him of the value he may have for us as a 
‘distant mirror’ which does not just reflect our own perplexities: Comenius is a topical thinkers 
although or because he is not a contemporary thinker and therefore may help us to overcome 
possible shortcomings of our concepts also and especially in the field of culture.10  
What we do find in Comenius, however, is the concept of cultura within a context which reflects 
the tension between particularity and universality which is also at the core of our current 
problems with culture.11 The basis for this reflection is laid by the fact that Comenius conceives 
of cultura as a threefold relation which is fundamental for the human being as such: its relation 
towards nature, fellow humans and God (Pampaedia III 10; CC II, col. 23). In the center of 
these relations the human being is placed with freedom as its essential feature; a freedom which 
implies the obligation to shape these relations and to bring them to perfection – which in turn 
presupposes the self-formation of the human being through education. Comenius repeatedly 
stresses that human freedom is the essential presupposition of and at the same time a possible 
danger for this process, making it on principle fallible, although Comenius is led by the 
unshakable hope that thanks to Divine grace the good end can and will be reached.12 Any 
dialectical relationship between human freedom and the teleology of history13 remains implicit 
in Comenius; if he takes a stand on this issue at all, it seems to be close to the position of Jakob 
Böhme who stresses the contingency of free action and therefore also of the evil that may result 
from such free action without eliminating this contingency on the higher plane of an all-
encompassing dialectical system.14 
Education, however, can take place only in cooperation with the instances towards which the 
human being as the excentric center of this threefold relation is directed (Pampaedia III 10; CC 
II, col. 23f.). So, due to its very core, the concept of cultura is not closed but presupposes an 
essential openness towards the other, what Jan Patočka called the ‘open soul’ in Comenius (cf. 
Voigt 2006). This openness is closely connected to the understanding of cultura in connection 
to the idea of cultus (CC I, p. 11; cf. the entry in Lexicon Pansophicum Reale; CC II, col. 914), 
of the caring cultivation of given foundations.15 Seen that way, cultura basically is a process of 
mutual completion. This is an idea we find very early in the thought of Comenius: Already his 
Prodromus Pansophiae can – and should – be understood as an “invitation to intercultural 
                                                          
9 The critique of an ‘evolutionist’ understanding of civilizations, which has to remain implicit here, does not 
necessarily mean the radical break with every ‘evolutionary’ approach which might also be situated in the 
context of an ontology which closely resembles that of Comenius, as can be see in in Beck 2004, 222-226. 
10 This is shown by Dörpinghaus 2008-2009, especially p. 32. 
11 Cf. Popelová 1983; Nolte 1992 
12 On freedom in Comenius cf. Voigt 2011b. 
13 On this see Meier in this volume. 
14 On this conception in Böhme cf. McGrath 2014. 
15 Cf. Schnitter 2011, pp. 62-66. 
dialogue”, as it conceives of different ages, regions, ideologies and even religions as sparks of 
wisdom scattered throughout space and time which have to be collected and to be brought into 
a functional order.16 
In order to underwrite the possibility and even the necessity of the mutual completion of 
cultures, Comenius outlines an according ontology (Pampaedia I 2-5; CC II, col. 4) which has 
its cornerstones the three concepts of ‘nothing’ (nihil), ‘something’ (aliquid) and ‘everything’ 
(omnia). This triad can be understood by looking at it from its top: 
As is well known, ‘everything’ in Comenius always has a qualitative ring to it, meaning not 
only and also not in the first place the total extension of some or any range of objects but rather 
the totality of perspectives from which any given object or kind of object cannot just be 
dominated or conceptually grasped, but be brought to its utmost perfection – as vigorously 
elaborated time and again by Klaus Schaller.17 The ontological level of ‘everything’ is the one 
on which in Comenius the transcendental determinations of Being –  unity, truth and goodness 
– fully come to bear.18 So this level in the eyes of Comenius is not just there for descriptive 
purposes; in this developing world, at least, it is not just there at all, but a task to be fulfilled, a 
goal to be reached: Our world is only as a possible world in the state of ‘everything’ which also 
would be a state of unity, truth and goodness; to bring it into such a state much remains to be 
done in what Comenius hopes for as a Divine and human cooperation on a final, millenarian 
stage of history.19 
In the meantime, we live in a world of ‘something’: We always are confronted with some kind 
and portion of something united in itself, something good and true; but, nearly tragically, these 
fragments of a possible wholeness are torn apart and tend to take themselves for the very whole 
they are supposed to integrate themselves into, so that the resulting conflicts are fought in the 
name of the aims they, as conflicts, by themselves frustrate.20 So ‘something’ for Comenius 
indicates the presence of a participation in principles which in themselves are valuable, but a 
participation which is flawed and imperfect and therefore in order to succeed tends to go beyond 
itself, in the direction of ‘everything’. 
With ‘nothing’ Comenius touches upon one of the basic problems of ontology which has been 
discussed in a controversial manner ever since Parmenides (and the sequel of the dialogue Plato 
named after him, the Sophistes): How can we talk or think about what supposedly lacks any 
determination, which blatantly is not there? Is not even the attempt to do so a piece of 
misunderstood language and logic? On the other hand, is not the very talk and thought of 
nothing so essential to our human understanding of ourselves and our world that we cannot 
eliminate it? This is one of the couple of questions that lies at the heart of the classical conflict 
between Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Carnap in the late 20s and 30s of the previous century. 
Heidegger famously claims that the nothing, as revealed by an ‘angst’ showing that we as beings 
in the world are within and at the same time different from that world, would annihilate (“Das 
                                                          
16 Cf. Beer 2005, pp. 324-332. 
17 Cf. Schaller 2010, 53f. 
18 On these attributes and the quest of Comenius for a transcendetal perspective fitting his pansophical project cf. 
Goris in this publication. 
19 Cf. Woldring in this publication. 
20 Cf. e.g. Comenius, Via lucis III 9-14, pp. 298f. 
Nichts selbst nichtet”), as it makes us feel or own nothingness.21 Carnap blames this statement 
for violating elementary rules of logic and semantics, for turning a syntactical part of a negative 
existential statement into the designator of a pseudo-entity.22 In a certain way, however, as 
Puntel has observed, Carnap approaches Heidegger’s concept of nothing when distinguishing 
between conceptual frames within which we speak of certain objects and questions transcending 
these frames.23 This gives a valuable clue for how to understand ‘nothing’ in Comenius: It is 
the point where the framework of transcendentals present in ‘everything’ and participated by in 
‘something’ breaks down – the point where this participation has not been reached (i.e., for 
Comenius, God has not yet created something which could do participate in everything). or 
failed (which Comenius typically depicts as an eschatological return into darkness24). 
Also cultura starts with nihil, in the sense of the not-yet. Obviously influenced by Eurocentric 
beliefs, Comenius still sees this starting-point present in remote ‘barbarian’ tribes (Pampaedia 
I 3; CC I, p. 15). However, we can abstract from this (also very cultural) limitation in the thought 
of Comenius and find his general position: As a process, cultura is not something given which 
can and be just received and passed on willy-nilly; it is rather something to be brought about 
and to be shared with others as an interactive process – something which cannot emerge in 
‘remoteness’, in the lack of mutual communication, which just needs this communication as the 
realm in which one’s own freedom encounters the freedom of the others. During this on-going 
process, cultura manifests itself indeed as aliquid, i.e. some-thing: as what we now could call 
the specific culture of a certain civilization, a specific culture which nevertheless is supposed 
to serve the perfection of the human beings within and without of that civilization. Comenius 
states that different “nations, sciences, arts, languages and the other disciplines of higher 
learning” divide up this kind of cultura among themselves (ibid., I 4; CC I, p. 15). This means: 
The status quo as seen by Comenius is better than the absence of any culture, but it is by no 
means the best of all possible states; it is a typical ‘something’-state in which contents which 
can and ought to be connected still remain separated across different fields of human efforts. 
This easily can be transferred to the connection between different civilizations, and Comenius 
has made this transfer, as we have seen above in the reference to Pansophiae Prodromus: The 
fundamental relation between civilizations is not separation but connectedness based on human 
freedom which is to be realized and shaped at the same time in mutual interaction. 
Accordingly, ‘some culture’ as such is oriented towards the omnia of cultura: the optimal 
relation of the human being towards the mentioned three instances, in which Comenius also 
finds the maximal realization of human freedom, which at the same time is the optimal 
‘reconciliation’ between the human being and the ‘image of God’ this being in its very freedom 
for Comenius is meant to be (ibid. I 5; CC I, p. 15).25 
                                                          
21 Heidegger 1929/21978, 113. 
22 Cf. Carnap 1932/2004, 93-98. 
23 Cf. Puntel 1997/2007, 281-287. Puntel’s paper as a whole offers a good introduction to this controversy. 
24 Cf. e.g. Pansophia, Mundus aeternus IX (CC I, coll. 1296-1303). Comenius notes here right at the beginning 
one could not say strictly that the “monsters of the world tom come” return to nothingness but in their lasting 
separation from God they come to feel their own nothingness – their failure to fully participate in the wholeness 
of Being. 
25 The imago Dei-doctrine as a central “sense construction” in Comenius is discussed by Meyer in this publication. 
As Comenius finds the imago Dei to be damaged and distorted, maybe one could also talk about a “sense 
reconstruction” in this context. 
 
3. The Challenge 
In the previous paragraph we have seen that there is no easy identification of our concept of 
culture and of cultura in Comenius. Rather, what is cultura in Comenius would put some 
normative constraints on our understanding of culture: Can and should we understand our 
different civilizations – and in order to be able to do so, our own civilization in the first place – 
as limited and interdependent resources for the individual and global development of a human 
freedom linked with human responsibility? Can and should we understand the very particularity 
of our particular civilizations – and in order to be able to do so, the particularity of our own 
civilization in the first place – as a way towards a universality which does not negate but fully 
realize human freedom together with its particular cultural backgrounds? Of course Comenius 
cannot answer these questions for us; but at least his heritage can enable us to ask these 
questions and to find appropriate answers, in an appropriate, intercultural way. Any 
intercultural way, however, always is the way of cultures in their mutual encounters and 
therefore rather an array of ways with their own histories, their own benefits and desiderata, 
their own problems, and, on yet another level of complication, with problems which may 
themselves have been evolved out of and involved in intercultural encounters. We are thrust 
into the situation of ‘something’, to speak with Comenius: Something is going on within a 
mixed-up world and we have to deal with it. And in the first place we have to acknowledge that 
we are in this situation; in the second place, however, we may also come to know that we are 
in this situation together. This is one step that can lead to questioning oneself, one’s own 
tradition which resources it offers to deal with this situation. Here we encounter Comenius with 
his claim that we should handle such situations so that all of us – all civilizations or cultures 
with all of the human beings in them – can go on together in them and maybe even search a 
way for all to overcome them. Which way to which goal – this still remains, and will forever 
do so, what has to be discussed in the framework of a universal consultation. As argued for by 
Lischewski,26 Comenius was very confident that the basic structure of this framework is above 
any human contingency. Such a confidence, even if we had it, however, would not have to 
prevent us from approaching other positions open-minded (or vice versa); on the contrary it 
might give the confidence needed for an – in the final analysis open-ended – exposure towards 
the other.27 Such an exposure can be entered in the spirit of Comenius with the conviction that 
cultural differences are opportunities for mutual cooperation and completion.28 This is – and 




                                                          
26 See his contribution to this publication. 
27 Cf. Voigt 2008. 
28 This is the condensed result of the international research project “Creative Peace through Encounter of World 
Cultures” initiated by Heinrich Beck (Bamberg). In the context of this project, Erwin Schadel and with his aid I 
came to appreciate Comenius as an exemplary representative of this way of intercultural thought and practice. See 
Voigt 2011c. 
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